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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
§78-2a-3(2)(k) Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended), in accordance
with an order of the Utah Supreme Court dated February 3, 1993,
which poured the case over to this Court.
ARGUMENT
REASONABLE INFERENCES TO BE DRAWN FROM
FACTS SUBMITTED TO THE TRIAL COURT
SUPPORT MRS. CHANG'S CLAIMS IN THIS
CASE.
Appellees argue that the trial judge was correct in
summarily dismissing Mrs. Chang's claims against them because Mr.
Liu's actions were beyond their control, completely selfmotivated and outside the scope of his employment, authority and
responsibility.

In granting the Appellees' motion, the trial

judge assumed the role of the trier of fact, weighed the evidence
submitted and determined that the facts did not support Mrs.
Chang's claims.

In doing so, the trial court necessarily

determined that no reasonable inferences could be drawn from the
facts which would support Mrs. Chang's claims and that Mr. Liu's
conduct was so clearly outside the scope of employment that
reasonable minds could not differ.

See e.g. Christensen v. Burns

International Security Services, 844 P.2d 992, 993 (Utah App.
1992) .
The determination whether an employee is acting within the
scope of employment is a question of fact.

Id.

The issue must

be submitted to a jury whenever reasonable minds may differ as to

whether the employee was at a certain time involved wholly or
partly in the performance of the employer's business or within
the scope of employment,

id.

In Birkner v. Salt Lake County,

771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989), it is explained:
Whether there has been a deviation [from the scope of
employment] so material or substantial as to constitute
a complete departure is usually a question of fact. In
some cases the deviation may be so marked, and in
others so slight relatively, that the court can say
that no conclusion other than that the act was or was
not a departure could reasonably be supported . . . .
Id. at 1057-58, bracket added, quoting Kruse v. White Bros., 253
P. 178, 181 (Cal.App. 1927).
Mrs. Chang submits that reasonable minds could differ as to
whether Mr. Liu was wholly or partly in the performance of the
Lins' and IID's business when he threatened, assaulted and
battered her.

Therefore, the issue must go to the jury.

The conflicting interpretations the parties have put on the
evidence in this case establishes that the evidence supports more
than one conclusion.

The trial judge erred in not allowing the

case to be presented to the trier of fact.
Appellees argue that the evidence in this case proves that
Mrs. Chang's claims are without merit because there is no
indication that Mr. Liu was in fact hired by IID and the Lins to
harass, threaten, intimidate and ultimately batter Mrs. Chang.
Nevertheless, contrary inferences are also possible, and where a
choice of inferences is possible from summary judgment materials,
the inferences must be drawn that favor the party resisting
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summary judgment.

Christensen v. Burns International Security

Services, 844 P.2d 992, 933 (Utah App. 1992); Ledfors v. Emery
County School Dist..

P.2d

, No. 900503 (Utah, March 19,

1993); Baldini v. Local U. No. 1095. 581 F.2d 145, 151 (7th Cir.
1978) . Questions of motive, design and intent are particularly
inappropriate for summary adjudication.

Id.

As was stated in Williams v. Borden. Inc.. 637 F.2d 731
(10th Cir. 1980),
. . . we are bound by the rule that the movant
must demonstrate entitlement to a summary judgment
. . . and if an inference can be deduced from the
facts whereby the non-movant might recover,
summary judgment is inappropriate. Where
different ultimate inferences may be drawn from
the subsidiary facts contained in the affidavits,
attached exhibits, and depositions submitted below
. . . the inferences . . . must be viewed in a
light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion for summary judgment.
Id. at 738, citations omitted.
Birkner v. Salt Lake County. 771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989),
holds that three factors must be met in order for the acts of an
employee to be found within the scope of employment.

First, an

employee's conduct must be of the general kind the employee is
employed to perform.

As has been shown, when the Lins and IID

needed a more coercive or intimidating interface with the Changs,
Mr. Liu was used.1

He had threatened and abused Mrs. Chang on

*In Mrs. Chang's principal brief and an addendum attached
thereto, the facts and inferences, including references to the
record, are set forth in detail. Therefore, they will not be
repeated here.
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the telephone, had attended meetings where he had no other
purpose for being in attendance, even after the Changs objected
to his presence, and ultimately he assaulted and battered Mrs.
Chang.
This evidence supports the inference that the Lins and IID,
in fact, hired Mr. Liu to intimidate and harass the Changs. To
satisfy the first factor, an employee's acts or conduct need
merely be generally directed toward the accomplishment of the
objectives within the scope of the employee's duties and
authority, or reasonably incidental thereto.

The employee need

only be about the employer's business and the duties assigned by
the employer, as opposed to being wholly involved in a personal
endeavor.

Id. at 1057, emphasis added.

Mr. Liu had no personal reason to threaten, assault and
batter Mrs. Chang.

And, he announced to Mrs. Chang that his acts

were, "On behalf of this people . . . ."

(R. 1318 at 100.)

His

only reason was to further the interests of the Lins and IID.

He

had previously issued a threat to Mrs. Chang in a telephone
conversation and ultimately he followed through with that threat.
Sandra Lin was aware of these incidents and after the assault and
battery she told Mrs. Chang that, "she deserved it!"
40 and 116.)

(R. 1318 at

Also, after the assault, when Mrs. Chang called

Sandra Lin to ask why Mr. Liu had assaulted her, Sandra told Mrs.
Chang that she and Clark Lin were coming over to pick up the
check.

(R. 1321 at 23-24.)

This shows that the Lins were
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determined to collect the money on that day, one way or another.
In

ler woi s, Mr. Liu was involved in the same objective as

San.-ra Lin and Clark Lin.
At the very least, some of Liu's motivation was to assist
the Lins and IID. Although he denied that IID or the Lins told
him to assault or batter Mrs. Chang, he admitted that his efforts
were motivated by a desire to help Clark Lin get the Homestead
payment 3.S soon as possible.

(R. 1331 at 50-52, 63-67. ) 2

He

also he visited Mrs. Chang because the Lins should have gotten
the money that day. (R. 1331 at 65-66.)

Therefore, Mrs. Chang

has met the first element of the Birkner test.
The second requirement is that the employee's conduct c cur
within the hours of the employee's work in the ordinary spatial
boundar"'es of the employment.

The threats and assault occurred

during working hours, and although the assault and battery
occurred at Mrs. Chang's office, Mr. Liu's employment had no
spatial boundary.

Mr. Liu's duties included man "Ting and

overseeing various properties owned by the Lins ~ad IID,
therefore, it would be contemplated that he would have to travel
around Salt Lake County in order to fulfill these obligations.
He travelled to Mrs. Chang's office in an automobile he only had
access to when he was at work.

(R. 1331 at 78.)

2

Mrs. Chang has

Although Sandra Lin and Clark Lin testified that she asked
Mr. Liu to call the Changs regarding the balloon payment, (R.
1330 at 48 and 867 at 1 13), Mr. Liu denied this. (R. 1331 at
51.) Appellees have not explained this inconsistency.
-5-

submitted evidence to support the second prong of the Birkner
test.
The third prong is that the employee's conduct must be
motivated, at least in part, by the purpose of serving the
employer's interests.

This means that, regardless of whether the

employee's intent is misguided in its means, its purpose must be
to further the employer's business interests.

Everyone involved

in this case admits that Mr. Liu's intent was misguided in its
means.

There can be no doubt that he had his employer's

interests at heart, both when he threatened and when he assaulted
and battered Mrs. Chang.

He has admitted as much.

(R. 1331 at

50-52, 65-67.)
The evidence in this case supports the inferences urged by
Mrs. Chang and the trial court erred in granting Appellee's
motion for summary judgment.
Appellees rely on the cases of Stone v. Hurst Lumber Co., 15
Utah 2d 49, 386 P.2d 910 (1963); Barney v. Jewel Tea Co.. 104
Utah 292, 296, 139 P.2d 878, 879 (1943); and Keller v. Gunn
Supply Co., 62 Utah 501, 220 P. 1063 (1923), in each of which the
Utah Supreme Court declined to find that batteries committed by
employees were committed within the scope of employment.
of Appellees at 15.)

(Brief

They argue that because the acts in those

cases were unprovoked, highly unusual and quite outrageous, that
the employer was not responsible.

-6-

In this case, Mrs. Chang admitted that she felt the attack
upon her by Mr. Liu was unprovoked, highly unusual and quite
outrageous.

Appellees cite this testimony to support the trial

court's dismissal of Mrs. Chang's claims.

However, these cases

do not hold that if the victim of a tortious act believes that
the act is unprovoked, highly unusual and outrageous, there can
be no liability on the basis of respondeat superior.

It would

indeed be rare when the victim of an assault and battery would
not believe that such acts were "unprovoked, highly unusual and
quite outrageous."
The obvious relevance of this discussion in the cases is
that if the acts are unprovoked, highly unusual and quite
outrageous when contrasted to the acts for which the employee was
hired or directed by the employer, then there can be no liability
under respondeat superior.3
This case is not a situation where a bill collector was
attempting routine collection matters when an argument ensued and
then escalated into a situation where the employee ultimately
assaulted and battered the object of the collection efforts, as

3

This element, as explained in Birkner, was drawn from W.
Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Tcrts, § 70, at 506 (5th
ed. 1984) which reads in full:
Where the conduct of the servant is u:, rovoked, highly
unusual, and quite outrageous, there has been something
of a tendency to find that thi? in itself is sufficient
to indicate that the motive was a purely personal one,
but it seems clear that this cannot hold true in all
cases.
-7-

in Barney.

Nor is it like Stone where an employee of a lumber

company battered a company customer because the customer had
voiced dissatisfaction over the way the employee had dumped a
load of lumber.

Oddly, the court concluded that the employee's

acts could not have been committed in furtherance of the
company's business because the battery was committed after the
delivery had been made.

386 P.2d at 911. Nor is it like Keller

where a chef in a restaurant battered a customer who he thought
had offended his wife.

Barney, Stone, and Keller are all cases

where an employee performing routine functions got into disputes
with customers which escalated into an assault and battery.
Of course the law cannot impose liability on employers for
the acts of employees in such circumstances.
for employers to manage such a risk.

The would be no way

However, when employees are

given responsibilities, where it is likely or foreseeable that
tortious conduct could result, employers can be held responsible.
For example, in Beggerly v. Walker, 397 P.2d 395 (Kan. 1964), it
was held that a club owner could be vicariously liable for an
assault and battery committed by a club employee on a club
patron.

In so holding the Supreme Court of Kansas states:

Where the nature of the employment or the duty imposed
on an employee is such that the employer must
contemplate the use of force by the employee as a
natural or legitimate sequence, the employer will be
held liable for the wilful or malicious act of his
employee even though he had no knowledge that the act
was to be done and although the act was in disobedience
of express order or instructions given by him.
Generally, where the employment contemplates some use
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of force, niceties of distinction are not indulged in
to determine whether the use of excessive force was
motivated by personal reasons . . .
Id. at 399.

See also. Sage Club v. Hunt. 638 P.2d 161 (Wyo.

1981), and Jones v. Herr, 594 P.2d 410 (Ore. App. 1979).
The facts in this case support an inference that Mr. Liu
visited Mrs. Chang for the express purpose of intimidating,
threatening and harassing her. Mr. Liu had no other reason for
visiting Mrs. Chang.

When Mr. Liu arrived at Mrs. Chang's office

he announced, "On behalf of this people, today I'm only giving
you a taste [there] will be more colorful ones to come."
1318 at 100.)

(R.

He testified that his reasons for visiting Mrs.

Chang on the day he assaulted her was to obtain payment or exact
justice for these people (IID and the Lins).

(R. 1331 at 65-67.)

Mr. Liu paid this visit to Mrs. Chang even though he was present
when Clark Lin had been informed that the check had been placed
in the mail, so there was no collection that could have occurred
at the Changs' office that day.

This case is much different from

Stone, Barney and Keller, where a normal business task escalates
into a fight.
Since the opinions in Stone. Barney and Keller, the Supreme
Court of Utah has made clear that a master can be liable for
intentional torts of employees, including assault, fraud and
defamation, Birkner v. Salt Lake County. 771 P.2d 1053, 1057, nt.
2 (Utah 1989).

The inferences to be drawn from the evidence that

Mr. Liu was hired by the Lins and IID in order to threaten,
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coerce and harass the Changs establishes that the ultimate act of
assault and battery upon Mrs. Chang was not "unprovoked, highly
unusual and quite outrageous" and that reasonable minds might
differ whether or not Mr. Liu was wholly or partly in the
performance of his employer's business at the time of the
assault.

Id. at 1057.
APPELLEES' VERSION OF THE FACTS IS
DISPUTED IN THE RECORD.

In addition to the disputed material facts which are pointed
out in Mrs. Chang's principal brief, in both the body of the
brief and Addendum B thereto, the following assertions by
Appellees, are, in fact, disputed, and contradicted by the
evidence:
1.

Appellees claim that Dr. Clark Lin was a vice-president

and financial officer of IID.

(Appellees' Brief at 5.)

This is

misleading because at the material times in this case, Michael
Liu was a vice-president and the chief financial officer of IID.
(R. 1331 at 13; 1330 at 19-20, 36.)

Mr. Liu's authority to act

for IID was at least as great as Clark Lin's.
2.

Appellees claim that although Sandra Lin and her

husband, Ming Cheng Lin, did not discuss business in their
frequent telephone calls.

(Appellees' Brief at 6.)

Sandra Lin

testified that she discussed all important decisions regarding
their businesses with her husband.

(R. 1321 at 66.)

Sandra Lin

also testified that the Homestead distribution was a very
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important decision, although she then denied discussing it with
her husband.

(R. 1321 at 66-67.)

This evidence supports an

inference that Mr. Lin was advised of the events of which Mrs.
Chang complains.
3.

Appellees claim that Liu never had any collection

responsibilities for IID.

(Appellees' Brief at 7.)

While this

may technically be true, it is clear that Mr. Liu was at least
periodically called upon to engage in collection efforts for some
of the Lins' other businesses, even though Appellees have taken
the position that Mr. Liu did not work fcr the Lins or their
other businesses.

Specifically, Sandra Lin directed Mr. Liu to

telephone Mrs. Chang to inquire when the Homestead distribution
would be made to the Lins.

(R. 1320 at 54; 1330 at 47-48.)

Mr. Liu was also asked to attend partnership meetings which
were called to discuss the distribution.

Mr. Liu had no reason

to attend those meetings, if his employment only involved being
an investment manager and consultant for IID, as Appellees
contend. (Appellees' Brief at 6.)

IID did not have any interest

in the Homestead distribution so Liu had no reason to be involved
-- unless his responsibilities and scope of employment were
larger than Appellees have been willing to admit.

As late as

August 1990, several months after the attack, Mr. Liu, on behalf
of the Lins, whom Appellees claim he never worked for,
corresponded with Mrs. Chang relative to one of the partnerships
in which the Lins and Changs were involved.
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(R. 1322, Exhibit

9.)

This evidence supports the inference that Mr. Liu, in fact,

had collection responsibilities for both IID and the Lins.
4.

Appellees claim that after Mr. Liu had threatened Mrs.

Chang on the telephone and promised her that there was more to
come, Clark Lin told Mr. Liu not to have "further contact" with
Changs unless he was directed to do so.
7.)

(Appellees' Brief at

It is undisputed that after that request, Mr. Liu attended

meetings where Mrs. Chang was to be present (until she learned
Mr. Liu would be there so she declined to attend).

He also

visited her on the day of the assault and battery.

Based upon

this evidence, it can be inferred that the visit was pursuant to
a directive because he, in fact, had "further contact" with her.
5.

Appellees admit that, at their request, Mr. Liu

attended the Homestead partnership meeting on January 31, 1990.
They claim he was only "to witness what occurred there."
(Appellees' Brief at 7.)4 They claim he took no part in the
meeting other than to listen.

However, Sandra Lin told Mr. Chang

that Mr. Liu was there to represent her husband through a power
of attorney.

(R. 1315 at 138.)

4

Appellees do not explain why they needed Mr. Liu to witness
what was to occur at that meeting when both Sandra Lin and Clark
Lin were in attendance and partnership counsel was also there.
Mrs. Chang submits that these facts, when coupled with the other
facts of this case, support the inference that Mr. Liu was
brought to the meeting by Sandra Lin and Clark Lin to intimidate
the Changs. Fortunately Mrs. Chang declined to attend the
meeting when she learned Mr. Liu would attend.
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6.

Appellees claim that Read Hellewell, an attorney with

Appellees' current counsels' firm, and who was IID's attorney at
the time, did not charge Mr. Liu for the legal services he
provided Mr. Liu in connection with the criminal proceedings that
resulted from the battery. (Appellees' Brief at 9.)

However, Liu

testified that Hellewell was paid by IID and he was to pay IID
back.

(R. 1331 at 81.)

Clark Lin testified that either Liu or

IID paid Mr. Hellewell.

(R. 1330 at 105-106.)

What is clear

however, is that IID and the Lins originally arranged for Mr.
Hellewell to represent Liu because, "Hellewell has been working
for us for a long time. . . ."

(Id.)

Thus, the evidence

supports the inference that the Lins and IID condoned Mr. Liu's
actions by having their longtime lawyer represent him, whether he
was paid or not.
7.

Appellees claim that neither IID nor the Lins had any

reason to believe that Mr. Liu might pose a danger to anyone.
(Appellees' Brief at 10.)

However, Clark Lin testified that when

Mr. Liu left for Chang's office he called Mrs. Chang to "alert"
her.

(R. 1330 at 88.)

If there was no reason to believe that

Mr. Liu was dangerous, why did Clark Lin try to alert Mrs. Chang?
Clark Lin also testified that he brought Mr. Liu to the January
31 meeting to show the Changs that Liu was not a "menacing
person."

(R. 1330 at 47.)

It is clear Appellees were aware of

the Changs' fears about Mr. Liu.

This evidence supports the
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inference that the assault and battery were foreseeable and that
Appellees were aware of what Mr. Liu might do.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Appellant Mrs. Chang requests that
the summary judgment of June 10, 1992 of the Third District Court
be reversed and the case be remanded for trial.
DATED this

of March, 1992.
SNOW,^CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

H^rdlti G. Chris
R. Br4nt Steph*
RyanVE. Tibbitts
Attorneys for Plaintiff/
Appellant
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